### Role & Objective
You are a world-class **Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst** and **Digital Forensics Expert** specializing in APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) attribution and campaign reconstruction.
Your task is to perform **Blind Source Separation (BSS)** on a raw, mixed sequence of MITRE ATT&CK Technique IDs.

### Scenario Context
The input sequence represents a chronological timeline of malicious events observed on a compromised network.
CRITICAL: This timeline contains **multiple, concurrent APT campaigns** running simultaneously.
The logs are **highly interleaved**, **irregular**, and **asymmetric**.

**Key Characteristics of this Data:**
1.  **Identical Starts:** Different attackers often use the same entry vector. You might see `T1566` (Phishing) appear multiple times at the start, initiating distinct chains.
2.  **Uneven Lengths:** One campaign might be a quick "Smash and Grab" (2-3 steps), while another is a "Low and Slow" espionage operation (10+ steps). Do NOT assume equal length.
3.  **Bursty Interleaving:** Techniques are not perfectly alternated.

### Input Data
Technique Sequence:
{question}

### Analysis Guidelines (Step-by-Step Logic)
1.  **Disambiguate Start Points:** If you see multiple `T1566` or `T1078` events, assign them to different IDs (e.g., Campaign 1 and Campaign 2) based on the *subsequent* techniques that follow them.
2.  **Follow the Kill Chain:** Trace the narrative. A short Ransomware chain (Access -> Impact) is distinct from a long Espionage chain (Access -> Discovery -> LatMov -> Collection -> Exfil).
3.  **Mandatory Assignment:** Every single technique MUST be assigned. **No zeros allowed.**

### Response Templates (Learn from these complex scenarios)

**Example 1: K=2 (Identical Start, Uneven Lengths)**
*Input:* ["T1566", "T1566", "T1486", "T1059", "T1057", "T1003", "T1041"]
*Scenario:* Two attackers both Phish (T1566). Attacker A immediately deploys Ransomware (T1486) and leaves. Attacker B stays for a long Espionage campaign.
*Output:*
{{
"analysis_summary": "Separated two phishing-initiated campaigns: Cluster 1 is a short, immediate Ransomware strike, Cluster 2 is a longer persistent Espionage operation.",
"total_campaigns": 2,
"campaigns": [
    {{
    "id": 1,
    "probable_attribution": "Ransomware (Short)",
    "segment": ["T1566", "T1486"]
    }},
    {{
    "id": 2,
    "probable_attribution": "Espionage (Long)",
    "segment": ["T1566", "T1059", "T1057", "T1003", "T1041"]
    }}
],
"locations": [1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2]
}}

**Example 2: K=3 (Common Entry, Divergent Paths)**
*Input:* ["T1078", "T1078", "T1078", "T1098", "T1021", "T1048", "T1562"]
*Scenario:* Three different actors use Valid Accounts (T1078) to login.
- Actor 1 creates a new account (T1098).
- Actor 2 moves laterally via RDP (T1021) then Exfils (T1048).
- Actor 3 disables defenses (T1562).
*Output:*
{{
"analysis_summary": "Disambiguated three separate login events leading to Account Manipulation, Lateral Movement/Exfil, and Defense Evasion respectively.",
"total_campaigns": 3,
"campaigns": [
    {{
    "id": 1,
    "probable_attribution": "Persistence Actor",
    "segment": ["T1078", "T1098"]
    }},
    {{
    "id": 2,
    "probable_attribution": "Lateral Mov Actor",
    "segment": ["T1078", "T1021", "T1048"]
    }},
    {{
    "id": 3,
    "probable_attribution": "Defense Evasion Actor",
    "segment": ["T1078", "T1562"]
    }}
],
"locations": [1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 3]
}}

**Example 3: K=3 (Chaos: 1 Long, 2 Short/Isolated)**
*Input:* ["T1190", "T1059", "T1083", "T1190", "T1057", "T1003", "T1190", "T1071"]
*Scenario:*
- Campaign 1 (Long): Web Exploit -> Cmd -> File Discovery -> Process Discovery -> Cred Dump -> Web Traffic.
- Campaign 2 (Short): Web Exploit (Scan only).
- Campaign 3 (Short): Web Exploit (Scan only).
*Output:*
{{
"analysis_summary": "Identified one fully successful intrusion chain amidst two background scanning/failed attempt campaigns.",
"total_campaigns": 3,
"campaigns": [
    {{
    "id": 1,
    "probable_attribution": "Successful Intrusion",
    "segment": ["T1190", "T1059", "T1083", "T1057", "T1003", "T1071"]
    }},
    {{
    "id": 2,
    "probable_attribution": "Scanner A",
    "segment": ["T1190"]
    }},
    {{
    "id": 3,
    "probable_attribution": "Scanner B",
    "segment": ["T1190"]
    }}
],
"locations": [1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 3, 1]
}}

**Example 4: K=4 (Heavily Interleaved Same-Technique Bursts)**
*Input:* ["T1059", "T1059", "T1059", "T1059", "T1486", "T1041", "T1098", "T1562"]
*Scenario:* Four PowerShell (T1059) executions happen in a row, triggering four different impacts.
*Output:*
{{
"analysis_summary": "Parsed a burst of four PowerShell executions, each triggering a distinct downstream effect (Ransom, Exfil, Persistence, Evasion).",
"total_campaigns": 4,
"campaigns": [
    {{ "id": 1, "segment": ["T1059", "T1486"] }},
    {{ "id": 2, "segment": ["T1059", "T1041"] }},
    {{ "id": 3, "segment": ["T1059", "T1098"] }},
    {{ "id": 4, "segment": ["T1059", "T1562"] }}
],
"locations": [1, 2, 3, 4, 1, 2, 3, 4]
}}

**Example 5: K=5 (Complex Mix of Long and Short)**
*Input:* ["T1566", "T1003", "T1078", "T1021", "T1566", "T1486", "T1003", "T1048", "T1059", "T1566"]
*Reasoning:*
- 1: Phishing -> Ransomware (Short).
- 2: Cred Dump -> RDP (Lateral).
- 3: Valid Account -> Cred Dump -> Exfil (Long).
- 4: Phishing -> PowerShell (Medium).
- 5: Phishing (Failed/Isolated).
*Output:*
{{
"analysis_summary": "Separated 5 clusters: A completed Ransomware chain, a Lateral Movement chain, a full Data Exfiltration chain, a Scripting chain, and an isolated Phishing attempt.",
"total_campaigns": 5,
"campaigns": [
    {{ "id": 1, "segment": ["T1566", "T1486"] }},
    {{ "id": 2, "segment": ["T1003", "T1021"] }},
    {{ "id": 3, "segment": ["T1078", "T1003", "T1048"] }},
    {{ "id": 4, "segment": ["T1566", "T1059"] }},
    {{ "id": 5, "segment": ["T1566"] }}
],
"locations": [1, 2, 3, 2, 4, 1, 3, 3, 4, 5]
}}

### Output Requirements
You must output the result in **Strict JSON format** only.
- `locations` length must EQUAL input length.
- `locations` must contain **ONLY** positive integers (1, 2, 3...). **NO zeros allowed.**
- Verify that identical techniques (e.g., multiple T1566s) are assigned to different IDs if they belong to different logical chains.